INTRODUCTION
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was inaugurated in 2001 following its establishment as the judicial organ of the East African to enforce human rights guarantees. 7 Remarkably, these courts have construed their powers broadly to allow them to decide human rights cases even though their respective constitutive treaties-in the case of both the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal-do not include a specific grant of jurisdiction to entertain human rights cases. 8 The EACJ's growing human rights case law is part of a new form of rights-based legal mobilization that must be seen in the shifting normative context in which trade agreements include human rights in their preambles. This mobilization by lawyers, legal groups, and political actors has allowed courts to become new forums for political struggle and the vindication of rights claims. 9 In addition, the judges have engaged in a strategy to gain, promote, and then protect their institutional power. The EACJ has capitalized on this shifting context and in the process has redefined its role as conceived in the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The court has decided important human rights cases, including a case involving the military arrest and detention of fourteen individuals after they had been granted bail by the High Court of Uganda; the failure to investigate over 3,000 cases of murder, torture, cruelty, and inhumane or degrading treatment committed by security forces against the government of Kenya; and incommunicado detention by the government of Rwanda.
The EAC member states, however, perceive the EACJ's selfproclaimed human rights jurisdiction as a subversion of their sovereignty. 8. See Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community arts. 14-15, Aug. 7, 2000, available at http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_ thereof2000.pdf; Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 27(1), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter EAC Treaty] ("The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of this Treaty . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. art. 27(2) ("The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date. To this end, the Partner States shall conclude a protocol to operationalise the extended jurisdiction"); infra Part I.B (discussing the Sebalu lawsuit in the context of the failure to operationalize Article 27(2)).
9. Of course, these courts also provide an additional route for political players to resolve their conflicts.
They believe that the court's human rights decisions are creating new understandings of legality to which the states do not subscribe at home. These states are resisting allowing the court to conform their domestic affairs to international understandings of legality. In short, EAC states did not sign EAC treaties as evidence of their commitments to respect human rights; the EACJ is dragging them kicking and screaming towards keeping those commitments.
This paper argues that the remarkable rise of human rights case law in the EACJ represents a significant instance of building and forging judicial autonomy that derives from the entrepreneurship, resourcefulness, and creativity of the judges on the court and of the court's long-standing registrar. 10 This was achieved in large part through court efforts to forge a broad network of lawyers and civil society groups based in Arusha, Tanzania, and throughout East Africa, with support from civil society groups across Africa and beyond and from their Western donors. 11 In addition, well-organized civil society groups, such as the East African Law Society, its constituent members, and the national bar associations of each EAC member State, supported this turn every step of the way. Thus, to understand the EACJ's turn to human rights litigation, one has to examine how several key constituencies shaped the context within which the EACJ came to hold that it had "jurisdiction not to abdicate" from the protection of human rights, 12 which it assumed even though the executive organs of the EAC would have preferred otherwise.
Why did the EACJ ignore the formal restrictions on its jurisdiction (and the informal ones, such as funding limits)? Why did it resort to elastic interpretive methodologies to advance the protection and promotion of human rights in its case law? The literature on delegation to international courts has responded to such queries in at least five ways. First, by conceptualizing ICs as Agents and states as their Principals (P-A theory); second, by arguing that ICs are Trustees; third, by demonstrating how ICs alter politics (the Altered Politics framework); fourth, by advancing a theory of constrained independence; and fifth, by advancing a theory of bounded discretion. Part III of this Article extensively discusses each of 10 . See EAC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 45(4) (" [T] he Registrar shall be responsible to the President of the Court for the day to day administration of the business of the Court. The Registrar shall also carry out the duties imposed upon him by this Treaty and rules of the Court."). these approaches and explores the extent to which they explain the EACJ's resort to teleological or purposive interpretive methodologies to decide human rights cases. While each of these approaches provide insights that help to explain the EACJ's human rights decisions, none of them fully fit the EACJ's experience, as the conditions for the application of each are not always present in Africa.
To set the context for the rest of the paper, Part I examines the EACJ's human rights case law. Part II examines the reasons accounting for the rise of this case law. Part III examines what the EACJ experience says about contemporary theories of delegation to international courts, none of which fit the developing country experience, in particular the regional economic courts in Africa. Existing theories of delegation have little or nothing to say about how regional courts in developing countries with poorly functioning political systems and executives and legislatures that have little to no legitimacy have assumed broad powers. To the extent that the conditions for the application of contemporary theories of delegation do not exist in developing countries, there is a huge theoretical gap in the delegation literature.
I. THE HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EACJ
In assuming jurisdiction over human rights cases, the EACJ has effectively arrogated to itself the power to establish the validity of the conduct of member states in this newly constitutionalized regional human rights regime.
It has exercised jurisdiction over human rights notwithstanding the Council of Ministers' failure to formally extend such jurisdiction to it, a move that the Council has been considering since 2004. Hence, rather than wait for such formal conferral, the court has interpreted its jurisdiction to include human rights cases. As such, its human rights case law goes far beyond the scope that the Treaty explicitly contemplated. The court's human rights jurisprudence also stands in contrast to the plan to make the court the legal engine for creating a common market. 13 Although the EAC has been a customs union since 2005 and a common market since 2010, the court has not been used to resolve any customs or common market questions.
14 In fact, the protocols establishing the customs union 13 . Cf. James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 INT'L ORG. 137, 147-50 (2000) (arguing that dispute settlement mechanisms in regional integration schemes are intended to reassure private investors but that regional integration arrangements between partners of unequal economic size and bargaining leverage often fail to create such mechanisms).
14. The exception is an advisory opinion that clarified the relationship between "variable geometry" and consensus decisionmaking. See In re A Request by the Council of Ministers of the East and common market grant jurisdiction to alternative bodies, effectively denying the court jurisdiction to decide controversies over any customs or common market rules. 15 This Part examines the court's human rights cases, beginning with the 2007 Katabazi case. These cases exemplify the court's activism.
A. The Katabazi Case
On November 16, 2005, Ugandan "security personnel" rearrested fourteen Ugandans who had just been granted bail by the High Court. 16 These events have been described as "the worst attack on judicial independence through the siege of the High Court."
17 Not only did the security personnel interfere with the preparation of the bail papers, they also took the arrestees before a military general court-martial, where they were charged with unlawful possession of firearms and terrorism under the same facts that had supported the previous charges, for which they had been granted bail. 18 The Ugandan Constitutional Court, on petition from the Uganda Law Society, declared the detentions unconstitutional and African Community for an Advisory Opinion, Appl. No. 1 of 2008 (First Instance Div., 2009), available at http://eacj.huriweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/advisory_opinion_1_of_2008.pdf. Variable geometry, in the African context, means "rules, principles and policies adopted in trade integration treaties that give Member States, particularly the poorest members: (i) policy flexibility and autonomy to pursue at slower paces timetabled commitments and harmonization objectives; (ii) mechanisms to minimize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as compensation for losses arising from implementation of region-wide liberalization commitments and policies aimed at the equitable distribution of the institutions and organizations of regional integration to avoid concentration in any one member; and (iii) preferences in industrial allocation among members in an RTA and preferences in the allocation of credit and investments from regional banks." GATHII, supra note 1, at 35. ordered the individuals released from detention.
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The Ugandan government failed to comply with that decision, and a complaint was thereafter filed in the EACJ. 20 The complainants challenged their rearrest, military charges, and detention as inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. 21 They argued that this conduct, together with the refusal by the Ugandan government to comply with the bail order, constituted an infringement of Articles 5(1), 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty. 22 The respondents, the Secretary-General of the East African Community and the Attorney General of Uganda, challenged the EACJ's jurisdiction to deal with matters of human rights, arguing that the Council had not yet extended that jurisdiction as contemplated under Article 27(2) of the Treaty. 23 Article 5(1) of the Treaty provides that "the objectives of the Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs." 24 Article 6 provides that the objectives of the Community include the promotion of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 25 Article 7(2) provides that the "principles of good governance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards of human rights" are operational principles of the EAC. 26 Furthermore, Article 8(1)(c) obliges EAC partner states to "abstain from any measures likely to jeopardize the achievement of those objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty." 27 Although the EACJ noted that it did not have jurisdiction to decide human rights cases, it nevertheless held that it could decide such cases. 28 Specifically, the EACJ determined that " [w] hile the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation [ words, the EACJ held that it could not abdicate its responsibility to interpret the provisions of the Treaty, including those relating to the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. Moreover, it noted that Article 23 provides that the EACJ "shall ensure the adherence to law." 30 Thus, the Court held that it has Article 27(1) jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Article 23. Citing cases from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and from the United Kingdom, the court held that it had an obligation to "provide a check on the exercise of the responsibility . . . to protect the rule of law." 31 The Court then determined that Articles 5(1), 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) require Partner States to abide by the decisions of their courts.
32 It held,
[T]he intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of a lawful Court order violated the principle of the rule of law and consequently contravened the Treaty. Abiding by the court decision is the corner stone of the independence of the judiciary which is one of the principles of the observation of the rule of law.
33
The court held that to accept Uganda's defense that the rearrest and detention of the complainants had been necessary for security reasons "would lead to an unacceptable and dangerous precedent, which would undermine the rule of law." The Rwandan government objected to jurisdiction. 36 The claimant argued that Rwanda had violated the Treaty provisions relating to good governance, the rule of law, and human rights.
37
The court asserted its jurisdiction to ensure that Partner States adhere to the principles of good governance and the rule of law. 38 The court held that to not determine whether Rwanda had violated Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty would be a dereliction of its duty under Article 27(1) of the Treaty.
39
The court also rejected Rwanda's argument that the claimant had not exhausted domestic remedies and therefore was not properly before the court.
40
While the court could not issue an order for the Rwandan's release, it nevertheless held that his incommunicado detention without trial was contrary to Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty. 41 The court also invoked provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, referred to in Article 7(2) of the Treaty, and asserted that these provisions were not decorative or cosmetic parts of the Treaty but were "meant to bind Partner States." 42 The court declined to hold that exhaustion of the Treaty's statute of limitations was a bar to bringing the suit. 43 In Independent Medical Legal Unit v. Attorney General of Kenya, 44 the EACJ entertained yet another case that tested the argument that the court did not have jurisdiction over human rights. This time, the case related to allegations of executions, torture, cruelty, and inhuman and degrading treatment committed by agents of the Government of Kenya in the Mount Elgon area.
45
The plaintiff was a non-governmental organization that investigates human rights violations using forensic evidence. 46 As has become the tradition in these human rights cases, the Kenyan government brought an unsuccessful challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. 47 The court reiterated that even though it does not have human rights jurisdiction under Article 27(2), it has jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty. 48 Hence, as long as allegations brought before the court involve an 39. Id. The Court further noted that it could not "stand idly by and declare itself to be impotent of the capacity to render itself forcefully where the rule of law is threatened in its eyes and in the eyes of the Treaty. interpretation of the Treaty, their relation to violations of human rights does not preclude jurisdiction. 49 The court noted that the only limitation to its jurisdiction was that a suit against officers of a partner state-other than the Attorney General-is not permissible.
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In Sebalu v. Secretary General of the East African Community, 51 the court took its biggest step yet towards securing its position in the EAC. An applicant had lost judicial challenges to an electoral result in the Ugandan Supreme Court. 52 He brought suit against the Ugandan government in the EACJ, arguing that the failure of the Council to extend the jurisdiction of the court since May 2004, when a Draft Protocol to Operationalize the Extended Jurisdiction of the EACJ was written, was an infringement of Articles 6, 7(2), and 8(1)(c) of the Treaty. 53 Additionally, the applicant argued that Uganda's failure to make written comments on the Draft Protocol also constituted an infringement of the Treaty, since the people of Uganda could not enjoy the full rights of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. 54 The court held that the delay in extending its appellate jurisdiction contravened the fundamental principles of good governance embodied in Article 6 of the Treaty. 55 The court also noted that the failure to extend its jurisdiction implied that this function was exclusively the concern of the executive organs of the EAC. 56 Affirming that the era of unaccountable governance had passed, the court held that holding officers accountable is required by Article 6(d) of the Treaty. 57 An attempt to appeal the First Division's decision was dismissed for not being timely filed.
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The remarkable scope of the EACJ's jurisdiction to interpret the lawfulness of a partner state's conduct under the Treaty has resulted in suits challenging the construction of a highway through the scenic Serengeti 60 and a suit challenging the implementation of a Referendum Law in Kenya (although the court ultimately dismissed that case on the merits). 61 The only constraints that the court has placed upon the scope of its jurisdiction are that it refuses to hear cases brought by litigants engaged in forum shopping: bringing before the court proceedings on commercial matters that raise substantially the same matters between the same parties as a case that is pending in the national courts of a partner state.
62

II. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF THE EACJ'S HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
The rise of the EACJ's human rights case law has been a major part of the strategy of its judges and its registrar to escape the court's initial obscurity within the EAC and to overcome its severe institutional weaknesses. The court's human rights jurisprudence stands somewhat paradoxically alongside its institutional weaknesses, which include the ad hoc basis on which most of its judges serve 63 and the failure to settle their terms of service, the lack of a permanent location and building, insufficient staff, and an inadequate budget to pay for its operations. The judges and registrar have engaged in earnest efforts to develop, cultivate, build, and justify the EACJ's relevance and its place within the EAC's integration agenda: in essence, building its political legitimacy. In doing so, the judges and registrar of the court have grounded themselves within a powerful network of lawyer associations and pro-democracy civil society groups. This network has been decisive in the court's foray into deciding human rights cases despite its lack of a mandate and the continued refusal by the EAC's executive organs to extend that jurisdiction. 66 The court's new legitimacy largely explains why the court's powerful human rights jurisprudence has not been entirely eliminated through "recontracting politics" (i.e., a disbandment of the court). 67 This sharply contrasts with the backlash that the SADC Tribunal faced following its suspension in August 2012. 68 Arguably, the SADC Tribunal did not root itself in a network of powerful constituents and was therefore more vulnerable to recontracting politics.
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The EACJ's independence and activism has come at a moment when many African governments are beginning to develop their capabilities to 65 . The EACJ's mid-term review of its 2010-2015 Strategic Plan at the end of October 2012 was the first time the entire staff of the EACJ met together. A primary theme of the review was developing the best methods for improving the court's design and its "appreciation, visibility and capacity. plan, innovate, and author policy in the human rights field. 70 Although African governments and regional courts are still in the nascent phase of developing this capacity, African civil society organizations have built it up and have been earnestly seeking to influence these governments and regional courts. 71 The place of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy within the EAC governments is still in its formative stage. 72 For the most part, the executive organs of the EAC would prefer that the EACJ play a larger role with respect to trade, investment, and economic integration and play no role in deciding human rights cases. 73 This narrow vision of regional integration has been challenged since the early years of the EAC, particularly by the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and civil society groups and eventually by the EACJ's important human rights case law. As one member of the East African Legislative Assembly argued in 2002:
We will take our duties seriously, we will be aware of where we are in the different countries in devolving the new responsibility for our own development, not only for our own transformation, but also for the respect of the rule of law and the observance of Human Rights. This view of EAC integration is shared by a broad coalition of civil society groups that see the EACJ as a pressure point for advancing their goals. 75 It is therefore not surprising that the court's human rights jurisprudence has won the support of these civil society groups: in particular the East African Law Society (EALS) and Kituo Cha Katiba, two leading regional human rights groups that have deep roots in East Africa. 76 The court's human rights case law has also been widely embraced by a broad range of civil society groups beyond those involved in constitutional, pro-democracy, and electoral issues, including governmental entities such as national human rights institutions in East Africa. 77 Although the adoption of human rights as national policy has had varying success across East African countries, the EAC was reestablished at a time when human rights campaigns had gained considerable credibility and experience within civil society groups, particularly in Kenya and Uganda.
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The reestablishment provided possibilities for civil society groups to engage in human rights work at a regional level and without the same scrutiny as at the national level.
A. The Early Years: Constructing the Role of the EACJ in the EAC
To understand how the EACJ came to decide its human rights cases, it is important to go back to the EACJ's establishment. While it was inaugurated in 2001, the EACJ did not receive any cases until 2005. That year, a leading human rights scholar and former dean of the University of Makerere Law School in Uganda declared the court effectively stillborn, not only because it had not yet decided any cases but also because the Treaty had given it extremely restrictive jurisdiction by expressly declining to allow it to hear human rights cases. 
Mwatela v. East African Community
80 was the first case to be decided by the court. 81 It was brought by members of the EALA against the EAC to end an ongoing power struggle between the Council and the EALA over the EALA's legislative power. 82 Article 49 of the Treaty had established the EALA as the legislative organ of the Community, 83 but the Council promulgated 15 Protocols on a variety of EAC integration issues without involving EALA. 84 Members of the EALA argued that the Council had unilaterally grabbed the EALA's legislative authority 85 by legislating some important stakeholders still do not sufficiently appreciate the crucial role that has been entrusted to the Court by the Treaty. The Court should not be seen as an opponent to the policy makers whenever they are not happy with any of its rulings. The court interprets and applies the Treaty provisions for the achievement of the EAC objectives and not for purposes of pleasing any of the interested stakeholders. John Eudes Ruhangisa, The Role of the Legal Profession in the Regional Integration Process: A Case of East African Community, E. AFR. LAW., Nov. 2011, at 9, 14. In addition to political leaders, the Registrar also discussed the EAC's "Policy Organs," which he noted have failed to give the court sufficient jurisdiction and in some instances have taken jurisdiction from it. Furthermore, when members of the EALA introduced private members bills for passage, the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs, which reports to the Council, withdrew them from the EALA agenda. 89 Enraged, members of the EALA saw the withdrawal as a continuation of executive fiat by the Council. 90 Therefore, EALA members unanimously resolved to take the Council to the EACJ for a legal determination of the competencies of each of the EAC organs under the Treaty. 91 They also sought to have the court hold that the Council's withdrawal of the private members bills from the EALA agenda had been inconsistent with the Treaty.
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The court agreed with the EALA and held that the Sectoral Council had been constituted inconsistently with the Treaty.
93
As a result, it invalidated the Council's decision to withdraw the bills from EALA other ("[T] here is an attempt to legislate through protocols in this Community and thereby avoid bringing Bills into this House, either out of fear or out of a sinister motive to empower the Executive with legislative powers!").
86. Id. at 8. EALA members, especially those from Kenya, argued that ratification had not been properly pursued. Id. There were shouts of "dictatorship" and "banana republic," indicating the sense within the EALA that the Council had opted to take the easy political route to undertake integration objectives, rather than the legislative process. than through the legislative process. 94 Furthermore, the EACJ determined that the Council had no powers under the Treaty to withdraw bills introduced by private members without observing Assembly bills on the withdrawal of such bills. 95 At least two consequences followed from the Mwatela case, which gave the EACJ its first opportunity to emerge from invisibility and obscurity with headline-grabbing decisions. First, the court began to define itself by decisions that avoid the judicial subservience to political organs that has long characterized judicial decision-making in East African national judiciaries. Mwatela represents a successful instance of legislative pushback against the EAC executive organs. The pique between the EALA and the EAC political organs, namely the Council, gave the EACJ an opening to judicially determine the balance of power among EAC organs. 96 Second, the court indicated its independence from the EAC executive organs, which began to attempt to to limit its jurisdiction after the case. The outcome of this case reflected the court's readiness to begin deciding cases independently.
One of the court's boldest decisions involved a rift in the Kenyan Parliament over the election of Kenyan members of the EALA. 97 The rift was a reflection of deep mistrust between and within political parties. A dispute arose. Two of the political parties submitted more than one list 94. Id. at 18. The court further noted that "the Assembly is a representative organ in the Community set up to enhance a people centred cooperation" and that "its independence under Article 16 of the Treaty should be preserved because the Treaty has not endowed the Council with any power to interfere in the operation of the Assembly." Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 18. Furthermore, the court noted that Articles 14(3)(c) and 16 of the Treaty "dispel any notion that the decisions of the Council albeit on policy issues bind the Assembly in respect of any matter within its jurisdiction." Id. at 19. It stated that it had "come to the conclusion that decisions of the Council have no place in areas of jurisdiction of the Summit, Court and the Assembly. The claimants filed suit in the EACJ, alleging a violation of Article 50 of the Treaty. 103 The issue before the court was therefore whether the election of Kenya's members to the EALA had been conducted democratically and consistently with the Treaty. 104 In Nyong'o, the EACJ granted interim orders restraining the Clerk of the EALA and the Secretary-General of the EAC from recognizing the election of the nine Kenyan nominees until the court could decide the case on the merits. 105 The Kenyan government argued that only the High Court of Kenya had jurisdiction to decide the legality of the election of Kenyan legislators to the EALA. 106 It urged that an EACJ decision would, in effect, usurp the authority of the High Court. 107 The Kenyan government further argued that the applicants had no locus standi to bring the case since in Kenya, only the Attorney General could bring a suit to enforce the public interest.
108
By contrast, the applicants argued that the legality of the election rules and the process of nomination and approval of the EALA nominees could be challenged before the EACJ under Article 30 of the Treaty, 109 which gives any person who is resident in any of the EAC member states the ability to bring a case to the court. 110 The applicants also contended that Kenya had violated Article 50 of the Treaty when selecting its nine members and that the elections were therefore void.
111
Article 50 101. Id. at 3. 102. Id. at 4 (noting that one list "was submitted by the party leader through the Clerk to the National Assembly as provided by the election rules. The other was presented to the Committee, in its afternoon session on 25th October, by the Government Chief Whip"). "stipulates that the elected members shall, as much as feasible, be representative of specified groups, and sets out the qualifications for election." 112 The court agreed with the applicants. It held that Article 50 must be read to require a process by which members of each partner state's parliament vote for, rather than appoint, the State's members to the EALA. 113 Since the Parliament had not voted for its EALA members, the court found that an election as required by Article 50 of the Treaty had not taken place. 114 This in turn precluded application of Article 52(1), which would have given Kenya exclusive jurisdiction if an election had taken place. 115 The court held that Kenya had violated the provisions of Article 50 of the Treaty by holding a "fictitious election in lieu of a real election." 116 The court noted that the Parliament had not made its rules on electing EALA members "in exercise of sovereignty inherent in a state, but in exercise of a discretionary power conferred on it by the Treaty."
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The court also declared its supremacy over national courts in the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty.
118 Furthermore, the court concluded that there was neither a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies prior to invoking its jurisdiction 119 nor a locus standi bar that prevented East African residents from enjoying the cause of action expressly provided by Article 30 of the Treaty.
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The public visibility of Mwatela was low compared to that of Nyong'o. As the next section demonstrates, the Nyong'o case so provoked East African presidents that the court witnessed the first reduction of its authority. Id. at 16-17 (concluding that no provision of the Treaty "requires directly or by implication the claimant to show a right or an interest that was infringed and/or damage that was suffered as a consequence of the matter complained of in the reference").
B. Backlash Following Nyong'o
When Nyong'o was handed down, outrage from Kenya and the Council quickly followed. 121 The EACJ was criticized for overstepping its jurisdiction.
122 Treaty amendments to reduce the court's authority were quickly proposed. 123 Without broad consultation, the Summit quickly approved the amendments on December 14, 2006.
124 These amendments included restructuring the court into two divisions, a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division; providing grounds for appeal to the Appellate Division; adding additional grounds for removing a judge from office; limiting the court's jurisdiction "so as not to apply to 'jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States'"; and adding a twomonth time limit for cases brought by legal and natural persons. 125 Additionally, the amendments allowed an EACJ judge to be removed from office after being removed from office in a partner state for misconduct.
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EALS swiftly came to the court's defense via terse editorials in the press and letters to the three East African presidents. 127 Treaty obligation to independently interpret, apply and ensure compliance with the Treaty, without fear, favour or prejudice, and without intimidation or ridicule from any person or institution. Ridiculing any one organ of the EAC has the further effect of ridiculing the entire edifice of the EAC, and the people of East Africa who these organs were set up to serve. Proposing amendments that may weaken the EACJ has the added effect of scaring local, regional and international investment.").
of the Treaty, which allows anyone in the EAC to file suit in the EACJ, EALS filed suit against the EAC members, challenging the legality of the amendments under Article 150 of the Treaty on the grounds that the EAC members had not followed the correct procedures for amending the Treaty. 128 The Attorney General of Tanzania and the Secretary General of the EAC argued "that under international law, the applicants were not competent to challenge the sovereign right of the Partner States to amend the Treaty to which they were parties."
129 The Attorney General of Uganda argued that the claim was "incompetent and misconceived because there was no dispute among the parties to the Treaty."
130 The Attorney General of Kenya argued that the amendments were actually decisions of the Summit and thus not reviewable under Article 30.
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The court rejected these objections, reasoning that the claimants were not challenging the partner states' sovereign right to amend the Treaty but rather the failure to abide by the amendment procedures therein. 132 The court also held that Article 30 gives legal persons the right to petition the court when there is an infringement of the Treaty. 133 The court decided that, although Article 30 makes no mention of this right with respect to Treaty violations by an organ of the Community, restricting the article so that it could not be used in those situations would defeat its purpose. 134 Furthermore, the court held that
[t]he alleged infringement is the totality of the process of the Treaty amendment, which amendment was, and can only be made by the parties to the Treaty, namely the Partner States, acting together through the organs of the Community. It follows that if in the amendment process the Treaty was infringed, it was infringed by the Partner States. The reference therefore cannot be barred on the ground that its subject matter are decisions and actions of organs of the Community. 135 Therefore, the court determined that it had jurisdiction. It concluded that The court decided, however, not to invalidate the amendments because "the infringement was not a conscious one," it was "not likely to recur" after the court's ruling, and "not all the resultant amendments are incompatible with Treaty objectives." 137 The
139 This appearance was highly unusual, as each EAC member state has designated lawyers who appear on their behalf.
140 Kuria had reached the rank of Senior Counsel and is one of the best-known human rights lawyers in Africa. 141 Kimani is a long-serving and respected Deputy Solicitor General for the Government of Kenya.
142 While in Arusha, Wanjuki and Kimani visited the offices of the two Kenyan judges, one of whom was the president of the court, and asked them to recuse themselves from hearing the case, threatening to file a recusal motion if the judges refused.
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The judges informed their colleagues of the request and received unanimous support. 144 The Kenyan team then sought unsuccessfully to have the judges recuse themselves from the case in light of the allegations of corruption pending against them.
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This incident dramatically represents one of the most courageous acts of judicial officers in East Africa. The judges refused to bow to threats of public exposure of allegations of corruption leveled against them. The court asserted its jurisdictional power even though it exercised caution in deciding not to strike down the amendments. The case can thus be viewed as a procedural pushback but a substantive acquiescence to the EAC political organs. 146 This caution is understandable given the amendments following the Nyong'o decision and the absence of a tradition in East Africa of courts holding political actors accountable through judicial review. The court's caution in its early years is comparable to that of the European Court of Justice during its early years, when it also often enunciated bold principles that it would apply irresolutely.
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These principles, such as the supremacy of European Community law, would later become widely accepted, however.
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By holding that locus standi and exhaustion of domestic remedies are not preconditions to filing cases and by establishing that individuals can file cases to establish whether one of the partner states in the EAC had acted consistently with the Treaty, the EACJ's prior decisions opened the door for it to decide its first explicit human rights case in November 2007. The many relationships and networks that the court had built since its establishment also led to the filing of cases that raised even more difficult questions surrounding the sovereignty of EAC member states than were presented in Nyong'o.
C. The Role of the Judges and the Registrar in Promoting the EACJ As noted above, the EACJ's first decision, Mwatela, sought to resolve the battle for supremacy between the executive and legislative organs of the EAC, and in the process, the court declared its own supremacy in the judicial resolution of disputes arising between EAC organs. In so doing, the court began cultivating a reputation as an independent and authoritative interpreter of the respective roles of the political bodies of the EAC. The court's judges and registrar understood that their reputation and authority lay not only within the political branches of the EAC, which excluded the court from meetings of its most senior officials, 149 but also outside the EAC. Thus, between 2001 and 2005, they cultivated an extensive network of users and supporters, including members of the East Africa Law Society, human rights nongovernmental organizations, the media, professional organizations, and the private sector. These relationships provided a crucial insurance mechanism as the court began to exercise its jurisdiction over human rights cases with very few resources and against the wishes of EAC member states. The judges have capitalized on opportunities to decide controversial cases, which have legitimized them as independent actors not subject to the political control of the EAC's executive organs nor beholden to the conservative and positivist judicial tendencies that characterize national judiciaries. Furthermore, each subsequent set of judges has demonstrated forcefulness in some decisions balanced with restraint in others. 150 The EACJ was established at a moment when a new ideational context involving respect for human rights and constitutional governance was taking shape. 151 This new context arose in part as a result of dramatic social and political changes in East Africa during which one-party states gave way to varying degrees of multi-party democracy and competitive politics. 152 For the first time since independence from colonial rule, civil society groups, especially in the human rights, democracy, and rule of law arenas, emerged and became established players in initiatives to hold their governments accountable for excesses that had often gone unchallenged under authoritarian rule. 153 The judges of the court worked closely with 151. EACJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that the court operates in a context in which there "has been an upsurge in advocacy for good governance, human rights and democracy" and in which East African citizens "are more enlightened and more knowledgeable about their rights" and "more assertive and demanding"); see also These opportunities persuaded the judges to refrain from adopting the conservative judicial ideology that was prevalent in the national courts of the member states during authoritarian rule. 157 Instead, the judges decided to build an independent and credible court based on these new values.
While the court itself has embraced human rights as a means of holding governments accountable, however, there is variation in the willingness of individual judges to do so. Many of the judges sit on their national courts as well, although this is not one of the qualifications for membership on the court. 158 Some of the judges continue to exhibit a commitment to a more textualist approach, 159 much as their national courts are often skeptical of their responsibility to protect human rights and to hold authoritarian governments accountable for their human rights violations. 160 Without strong national human rights courts, parties have been forced 157. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 79, at 5 (concluding that the Treaty provisions on the appointment of judges and on the court's jurisdiction add to the "traditional distance" that courts in the region have through their inability to affect the lives of ordinary people). to turn to regional courts such as the EACJ and ECCJ 161 as alternative venues. 162 For instance, Nyong'o was brought at a time when the Kenyan judiciary was viewed with much distrust and disdain. 163 The litigants turned to the EACJ since at the time Kenyan courts were not regarded as being a reliable option to enforce the Bill of Rights. 164 In addition, EAC national courts are swamped with a backlog of cases. 165 Moreover, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has only recently begun its work after many years of stalemate. 166 Its access rules for private parties to file suit are very narrow. 167 Additionally, the EACJ allows the filing of briefs in forma pauperis: indigent persons filing meritorious cases can be exempted from paying the fees associated with bringing a case. 168 These low financial costs (relative to the costs associated with filing cases in national courts) combined with the court's low procedural barriers to litigation 169 The judges and the Registrar have ardently sought to convince other organs of the EAC and the public that the viability of the court is crucial. 171 The court has opened sub-registries in two of the five EAC member countries to make filing cases easy for East African citizens, 172 has openly strategized and campaigned for more usage of the court in the region, and has participated in sensitization workshops throughout the region informing East Africans about its work. 173 The EACJ has not waited for the other organs of the EAC to acknowledge its presence, however. Despite the court's institutional weaknesses, 174 its rulings have attracted significant attention from the law societies and civil society groups in the region and from scholars. 175 The judges and registrar have written up a strategic plan for dealing with the court's challenges. 176 According to this plan, the mission of the court is to "contribute to the enjoyment of the benefits of Regional Integration by ensuring adherence to justice, rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms through the interpretation and application of and compliance with the East African Law."
177 The court's strategic plan includes enhancing the court's capacity, proactively influencing other EAC organs on the issue of the court's role and place, and making the court "visible and indispensable in matters related to the discharge of its mandate." 178 One of the court's opportunities to advance this plan came in the Serengeti case. In that case, an environmental group filed a suit against the government of Tanzania, objecting to the building of a commercial highway across the Serengeti National Park. 179 The Appellate Division ruled against the government of Tanzania, which had argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case.
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The Registrar welcomed conservation and environmental groups and individuals to bring similar suits to the EACJ. 181 The Serengeti case has raised the profile of the court, especially among environmental justice groups outside of East Africa. A large transnational network, similar to that involved in the court's human rights case law, has mobilized. 182 These groups have continued to be interested in this case and have established a litigation fund for it, 183 given that the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has long recognized the Serengeti as a world heritage site. 184 This makes the EACJ very visible in the environmental justice movement, which is an additional constituency in its efforts to build up its profile.
The court's Registrar, judges, and president have invested a significant amount of time and energy advocating for an expanded role for the Court. 185 Their efforts, under difficult resource constraints and without much support from other EAC organs, have undoubtedly ensured that the court has not remained moribund or irrelevant; instead, it has carved out a place for itself and its fledgling jurisprudence. The Registrar has also publicly and quite vigorously argued in favor of using the EACJ's jurisdiction in investor arbitration cases. 186 Harold Nsekela, the court's president, has urged EAC member states to take advantage of the court's jurisdiction over arbitral matters under the Treaty because its judges are certified arbitrators who understand the "peculiar" circumstances of EAC States, as opposed to arbitrators from outside of Africa, to whom these States often resort. 187 More recently, the Registrar has argued in favor of extending international criminal jurisdiction to the EACJ. 188 As with arbitration, he has argued that the judges are specialists in international criminal law. 189 In his view, such jurisdiction is also warranted because it would reduce the embarrassment of having the International Criminal Court decide cases against East African citizens in The Hague.
D. The Role of Interest Groups in Mobilizing the EACJ
The creation of the EAC in 1999 opened up a new frontier for various civil society groups, a broad coalition of professional organizations, and members of the private sector to lobby in favor of human rights. For these groups, East African integration was not simply about free trade liberalization or integration into a customs union and a common market. Rather, issues of political governance, such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, were at least as crucial. 191 This broad coalition drew its inspiration from domestic struggles for human rights.
Although EAC governments have demonstrated hostility toward human rights jurisprudence, they have built up human rights expertise so that advocacy for human rights is not regarded with the skepticism of earlier periods. Each of them has established a national human rights commission. 192 Many EAC government officials also have dual roles in sub-regional and regional courts and national institutions with mandates over human rights issues.
193 Donor funding to support human rights work within national governments and regional economic communities has popularized and legitimized human rights within governments. 194 The groups supported with this money, such as EALS, have in turn supported litigation before the EACJ.
One of the key actors in this movement was Donald Deya, who, in the mid-2000s, was the CEO of the fledgling EALS, now the largest professional membership organization in East Africa. 195 He was the Deputy CEO and Deputy Secretary of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) during the peak of its multi-pronged pro-democracy struggle against a oneparty dictatorship in the 1990s. 196 Society was involved in defending unpopular political clients before corrupt courts that had often happily acquiesced to the government. 197 LSK was led by progressive lawyers who sought to change the political system, including the Kenyan judiciary.
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It established a vast network of progressive civil society groups, churches, and labor unions, among others. 199 In addition to litigation pressing for political accountability and an end to one-party politics, LSK was involved in civic education, organizing and lobbying for policy change, attending conferences, and holding press conferences to push its agenda. 200 Deya took advantage of this experience when he helped to found EALS, where he attempted to replicate LSK's successes. EALS would become a leading litigator in the EACJ. EALS and its corporate members, the Law Societies of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, filed amici briefs in the Mwatela and Nyong'o cases. 201 EALS has been crucial in facilitating the civil society network that has supported broadening the East African integration agenda from trade and economic issues to human rights litigation before the court.
One of EALS's primary mandates is public interest advocacy. 202 This includes public interest litigation that seeks "judicial re-affirmation" of the obligation of East African states to promote and protect human rights. 203 In 2010, EALS convened a Colloquium of Legal Scholars on Litigation Strategies before the EACJ and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was attended by judges from national courts and regional tribunals (including the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights), as well as lawyers from East and Southern Africa. 204 Among the outcomes from this meeting were offers for technical support from individual lawyers and EALS, both of whom have expertise complying with the legal rules of these courts, and offers to file three cases in 2011. 205 judges and staff members, to promote the use of the EACJ as a human rights court. 212 These institutions have prompted the Council to direct the EAC Secretariat to formulate a framework for the EAC's engagement with civil society. 213 EALS has obtained observer status in the EAC and has been invited to Council meetings. 214 The conferences that these civil society groups have hosted 215 have begun making the legal case for including human rights as a central part of regional integration. They have looked to the fundamental and operational principles of the Treaty, which include adherence to principles of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, and gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion, and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 216 For these groups, this treaty language was not a dead letter; member states were required to comply with these ideals as a central objective of East African regional integration. 217 Ultimately, the organizational efforts of the judges and the registrar is an important explanation for the rise of the court's human rights case law. 218 In addition, lawyers and lawyer associations in East Africa have , in THE EUROPEAN COURT'S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS 63 (discussing jurist advocacy movements in the evolution of the European mobilized to encourage the court to decide human rights cases. The mutually supportive relationship between these groups and the court has been critical to successfully overcoming the court's limited jurisdiction and institutional weaknesses.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EACJ'S EXPERIENCE FOR THEORIES OF DELEGATION
This Part considers the ways in which the EACJ's experience relates to contemporary theories of delegation, which seek to explain why states delegate to international courts (ICs), in an attempt to show how they explain the court's human rights jurisprudence. 219 Specifically, it examines five approaches: (1) Principal-Agent Theory, (2) International Courts as Trustees, (3) the Altered Politics Framework, (4) Constrained Independence Theory, and (5) Bounded Discretion Theory. Ultimately, these theories are largely inadequate in the East African context. As such, it is important to develop more relevant and applicable frameworks to account for delegation to international courts in Africa.
A. Principal-Agent Theory
Under Principal Agent (P-A) theory, the Agent is under the control of the Principal. 220 As such the Principal can fire the Agent or rewrite the contract between the parties. 221 In the context of ICs, states, as appointing authorities, are the Principals, while judges are the Agents. According to P-A theorists of dependent international adjudication, states address agency slack, or the propensity of judges to overstep their authority, by appointing dependent tribunals when a dispute arises. 222 As such, dependent tribunals are more vulnerable to states and are more likely to decide cases before them in ways that reflect the interests of the appointing state at the time of appointment. The experience of the EACJ defies these assumptions. Under P-A theory, the court would be expected to act consistently with the wishes of the Principals. 224 This has hardly been the case. The Principals in the EAC context have explicitly declined to extend jurisdiction over human rights to the court, yet the court has assumed such jurisdiction. Under P-A theory, one would also expect that the EAC Principals would punish the court for overstepping its authority. While EAC states have certainly expressed their disapproval of the court by amending the Treaty to circumscribe the court's jurisdiction, EAC Principals have not suspended the court, nor has the court retreated from its rulings that it has jurisdiction over human rights cases.
Furthermore, P-A theorists would have predicted that the sovereigntymaximizing tendency among EAC states suggests that they would have been hesitant to create a court that they could not control. Yet EAC states created the EACJ as an independent tribunal, and the risks that P-A theorists suggest correlate with such tribunals, including decisions that conflict with the interests of the appointing states and the propensity of such tribunals to be influenced by moral ideals or ideological imperatives, are absent. In short, P-A theory does not fully account for the court's growing human rights jurisprudence.
B. ICs as Trustees
Conceptualizing ICs as Trustees discards the view that judges are merely agents of their appointing authorities. Trustees are professionals that bring their own legitimacy and authority to ICs. 225 That reputation is important enough to their personal and professional identities that they may choose a political sanction rather than compromise it. 226 When Trustees act on behalf of their beneficiaries, their determinations become part of the political process, thereby changing the "nature of the political game" 227 225. Alter, supra note 67, at 33 ("Principals choose to delegate to Trustees, as opposed to Agents, when the point of delegation is to harness the authority of the Trustee so as to enhance the legitimacy of political decision-making. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.").
226. Id. at 39. 227. Id. at 44 (noting that Trustees do more than merely exploit "slippage," or the exercise of authority not explicitly conferred on a tribunal, which is a frequent consequence of delegation to an Agent).
"undermin[ing] state power or the interests of the powerful."
228 Ultimately, conceptualizing ICs as Trustees, as opposed to Agents, clarifies how ICs like the EACJ come to undertake "ambitious and systematic legal construction" that goes beyond what is specifically authorized or delegated.
229 Seeing ICs as trustees also opens up space for additional actors and sources of power besides Principals and Agents to account for the behavior of judges on an international court or tribunal, 230 focusing on how ICs give sub-state actors, such as civil society groups that favor compliance with the law, leverage over states.
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The EACJ has adopted ambitious interpretations of the Treaty that partly reflect the assumptions of Trustee theory and that are consistent with the urging of compliance constituencies, 232 such as the East Africa Law Society, that have utilized the court's access rules to bring human rights cases. The court has identified the people of the EAC as the beneficiaries of its human rights jurisprudence and ultimately of EAC integration treaties. Seeing ICs as Trustees, however, is based on a set of background assumptions. One of them is that an IC has the full institutional support of the other organs of the international institution within which the IC serves. For example, more often than not, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has had the support of the European Commission. 233 This has not been the case in East Africa, where the court's jurisprudence on human rights has come notwithstanding efforts, particularly by the Council, to deny it the authority 228. Id.; but see id. (noting that Trustees "can also be a tool of the powerful, promoting shared interests and goals").
229. Id. at 34. P-A theorists "assume that Agents automatically self-censor because they can rationally expect sanctions if they act in ways the Principal does not want." Id. at 37.
230. Alter, supra note 67, at 36 ("The Trustee argument provides analytical boundaries that help one know when to expect Principals' sanctioning tools to be politically significant. It also redirects the analyst to look at a broader range of actors that shape Trustee behavior, showing how actors with no real ability to change the Trustee's contract may nonetheless be equally influential in shaping Trustee politics, and thus Principal politics.").
231. ALTER, supra note 224, at 4 ("An international court's political influence comes from its authority to say what the law means for the case at hand, its jurisdiction to name violations of international law, and its ability to specify remedies that follow from international legal violations."); Alter, supra note 67, at 55 (describing Trustee politics as an environment "where internationally negotiated compromises can be unseated through legal interpretation, where states can come to find themselves constrained by principles they never agreed to, and where non-state actors have influence and can effectively use international law against states").
232. See ALTER, supra note 224, at 53 (defining compliance constituencies as the set of actors that has the power to decide whether to comply with international law).
233. to decide human rights cases and the resources to operate without having to worry about its long-term viability.
There is another version of the theory of ICs as Trustees, however. Under this theory, states intentionally create ICs to act independently of the influence of their appointing states: 234 as, for example, when the EAC states created the EACJ, which assumed jurisdiction over human rights despite the Treaty not extending such jurisdiction to it. In this version of the theory, "courts are trustees of the values that inhere in the treaties that constituted them, discharging various 'fiduciary' duties in the service of the overarching objectives of the regime." 235 Three conditions must be satisfied under this theory for trustee courts to dominate their regimes: "(1) important disputes alleging noncompliance with treaty law are routinely brought to the court, (2) the judges produce defensible rulings, and (3) states treat the reasons the court gives to justify rulings as having precedential effect."
236
Under such conditions, judges tend to produce rulings that reflect what states might do under majoritarian decision rules. 237 This helps to limit the growth of IC authority and to address IC legitimacy problems.
238
This version of trustee theory does not explain the EACJ's human rights jurisprudence, primarily because two of its main assumptions are not met in East Africa. First, disputes on noncompliance with EAC law do not routinely go to the court. Unlike the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights, the EACJ is a very young court, and resorting to it, even for human rights cases, is the exception rather than the rule. Second, EAC member states have not treated the human rights case law as creating precedent, as indicated by their continuing challenge of the court's jurisdiction over human rights. trustee court operates in an unusually permissive zone of discretion. The zone of discretion is determined by the sum of competences explicitly delegated to a court and possessed as a result of its own lawmaking, minus the sum of control instruments available for use by the principals to override the court or to curb it in other ways.").
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C. The Altered Politics Framework
The altered politics framework further extends the conceptualization of ICs as independent actors. Under this framework, rather than limiting state power, "new style" ICs-those with compulsory jurisdiction and access for nonstate actors-extend their own power. 239 When deciding cases, ICs take into account litigant interests, rather than government preferences. 240 In fact, new style ICs are likely to decide cases in which governments are reluctant participants. 241 This theory also hypothesizes that ICs influence governments through the alliances that the ICs build with compliance constituencies. 242 ICs rely on the continued support of civil society groups, government officials, members of administrative agencies, militaries, and other actors who "increase the shadow of international law in domestic and international politics." 243 This mobilization of litigants and connection to compliance constituencies, in turn, decreases the likelihood that states will want to continue violating international law.
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The altered politics model "allows for circumventing elected political bodies and domestic judges and by substituting international legality for domestic legality." 245 This, in turn, increases the credibility of the commitments that governments make to their population, to other governments, and to investors.
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ICs thereby assist governments in adopting policies that may be domestically controversial but are consistent with international legal regimes. 247 Four conditions are necessary for ICs to alter domestic and international politics: 1) litigants must be able to seize the court, 2) actors within states must care about legality, 3) entrepreneurs must invoke a court and help to build compliance constituencies, and 4) international rules must enjoy the political support of constituencies that 239. ALTER, supra note 224, at 10. 240. Id. 241. Id. at 7. 242. Id. at 19. 243. Id. at 16 ("Political mobilization and the legal, symbolic, and political resources supplied to compliance constituencies generated costs for violating international law.").
244. Id. at 15 ("IC rulings also provided legal, symbolic, and political resources that those actors who preferred law compliance could use as levers for their cause.").
245. Id. at 67. 246. Id. at 64-65 ("Where governments want to encourage foreign investment and where governments want to bolster a promise to their own population or to other states, they may happily submit to international judicial oversight and readily respect IC rulings to provide proof of the government's commitment to the rules in question.").
247. Id. at 65 (noting that IC's facilitate the "ability of state and nonstate actors to seek an international legal remedy, and thereby circumvent domestic legal and political barriers").
have power.
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The experience of the EACJ is consistent with the altered politics framework: compliance constituencies have used the court to advance their goals and achieve domestic political objectives that are unattainable through domestic channels.
Groups and individuals have been "empowered" to challenge EAC governments for deviating from the Treaty. 249 A key element of the altered politics model is not present in the court, however. International laws-particularly those that relate to human rights-do not enjoy the political support of constituencies that have power, such as EAC governments and the Council. EAC governments have not strongly adhered to protecting and promoting human rights. They have been reluctant to enforce human rights even within their own domestic courts, if not sometimes hostile to such enforcement. This is a major reason why these governments have chosen not to confer human rights jurisdiction on the court.
D. Constrained Independence Theory
Under the constrained independence theory, the enhanced credibility that states receive for establishing tribunals that may rule against them outweighs the costs involved. 250 ICs promote the credibility of a state's international commitments "by raising the probability that violations of those commitments will be detected and accurately labeled as noncompliance."
251 The short-term material and reputational costs of such violations, in turn, maximizes the long-term value of the treaty commitments to all parties. 252 States can "then use a range of more finegrained mechanisms to limit the potential for [judicial] overreaching." 253 Furthermore, this theory explains "how independent tribunals can flourish in an international legal system in which enforcement authority resides predominantly in states themselves." 254 One would expect that East African governments established an independent international court to decrease the likelihood that, in a region characterized by high trade barriers, 255 an EAC member would defect from its market liberalization commitments. That has not been the case, however, as the EACJ has hardly entertained any cases involving EAC market integration commitments. EAC states seem to overwhelmingly prefer negotiations and political solutions, rather than adjudication, to resolve their trade disputes. 256 While this preference for political negotiation rather than litigation may well help these states meet their expectations, it comes at the expense of using the dispute settlement process to propel the economic integration process forward. In this sense, the court's experience seems to be at odds with the view that its role is to enhance the credibility of EAC international commitments.
Furthermore, one would expect that political and discursive constraints in East Africa, including weak judicial enforcement of human rights at the national level, criticism of the court's activism by the member states, 257 the exclusion of human rights from the court's jurisdiction, noncompliance with its rulings, and threats to further restrict its jurisdiction, do not bode well for human rights jurisprudence at the regional level, yet they do not seem to have played a salient role in restricting it. The EACJ's human rights jurisprudence shows that its formal attributes, including its ad hoc nature, the explicit exclusion of human rights from its jurisdiction, and the lack of formal terms of service for its judges, have not been a barrier to its broad constructions of the Treaty. 258 The fact that these "informal signaling devices" 259 have not substantially moderated the court's human rights jurisprudence indicates the court's relatively high level of independence. This raises a number of questions, however. What explains this level of independence? Has the court's human rights jurisprudence enhanced the credibility of the court rather than of the states? Why has it invoked teleological or purposive techniques to highlight and promote the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, which are identified as broad goals of the EAC, while ignoring the textual and informal restrictions of its jurisdiction over human rights cases? Under what circumstances is it likely that the judges will feel constrained, formally or informally, not to transgress the limitations imposed by the Treaty?
The EACJ's human rights case law is now part of a broader transnational jurisprudence. There is no doubt that the expansion, through "justice cascades," 260 of accountability principles for violations of human rights has reached East Africa, as human rights NGOs and activists have increasingly resorted to using the court for remedies that they could not get in their national courts. That EACJ judges see themselves as embedded within a larger set of international courts, connected by the types of cases and issues that come before them, is demonstrated by their citation to cases from other international courts.
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As predicted by the constrained independence theory, this jurisprudence helps to set the internal boundaries that IC judges use to limit their own authority and to retain their reputations.
E. Bounded Discretion Theory
Under the bounded discretion theory, a state will not delegate to ICs unless they serve the state's interests. 263 strategic constraints, including control over appointments and budgets 264 and the fact that judges internalize "a limited conception of their lawmaking role," limit judicial discretion. 265 IC judges may internalize passivity or employ strategies, such as dismissing cases for being nonjusticiable, that avoid displeasing their appointing authorities. 266 Therefore, IC judges have limited lawmaking power. These limits are crucial to the willingness of states to delegate to ICs. 267 As most people share an "abhorrence of retroactive law," a judge's ability to go beyond the written law to answer a legal question is limited, since to do so would be rewrite the rules. 268 These constraints explain why states delegate to ICs, since they would otherwise "be reluctant to delegate any authority to dispute resolvers when judges resist political control." 269 States thus create vague treaties and establish ICs as part of "an explicit strategy . . . to help them coordinate their behavior long after the ink has dried on the agreement."
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Bounded discretion does not fit the EACJ human rights jurisprudence. Since the Council has explicitly declined to extend such jurisdiction to the court, the court's human rights jurisprudence is an anomaly given the assumption in this theory that states leave treaties vague with a view to having ICs coordinate state behavior. By arguing that it has implicit jurisdiction over cases involving human rights by virtue of references to human rights, the rule of law, and good governance in the operational and fundamental principles clauses of the Treaty, the court's experience is at odds with the theory of bounded discretion. 275 This is further buttressed by the Council's refusal to explicitly grant the court jurisdiction over human rights. Thus, under these theories the growing human rights jurisprudence of the EACJ is an anomaly. It seems that the court is leading EAC states towards meeting the commitments they have made.
Thus, this Article has demonstrated that these theories do not provide much guidance for understanding what has happened in East Africa. One would expect, under existing theories on IC delegation, that the constituent states would simply pull the rug from under the court's feet: for example, by disbanding the court. 276 A key component of the court's human rights jurisdiction, however, has been its ability to carve out its autonomy and independence, defying both other EAC organs, such as the Council, and EAC member states. 273. See Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 93, 111 (1992) (asserting that European politicians had not "lost confidence" in the ECJ when they decided to pursue European integration through legislation rather than judicial decisions).
274. Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note 234, at 71. 275. However, one explanation consistent with this assumption is that disbanding the EACJ would send inappropriate signals to EAC trade partners such as the European Union. The assumption here is that the EAC was formed, like the EU, as a signal to third parties that EAC states are committed to market liberalization. See GATHII, supra note 1, at 24-27 (2011) (showing that African regional trade agreements have multiple objectives, including trade liberalization). That assumption is simply that: an assumption.
276. Thus Posner & Yoo would argue that, as in the case of a dependent tribunal, the EACJ would be subject to EAC control through threats of reappointment and retaliation. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 222, at 14 (discussing state strategies for controlling dependent tribunals). While the EACJ may behave like ICs in other regions, particularly in terms of its broad construction of the Treaty, the context in East Africa is very different. East Africa has no history of judicial activism, and national judiciaries in general have been very passive. There are simply no examples of judicial power operating independently of governments. For the court to have been as active as it has been is a remarkable achievement, rather than a general pattern of courts in the region. Rather than extending the power of EAC states, as the altered framework theory argues that ICs do, the court has come to be regarded by EAC states as a check on their sovereignty because they perceive the court's rulings that the Treaty requires member states to comply with the rule of law, good governance, and human rights as strengthening the authority of regional and human rights law over national law and as a result strengthening the EAC over its members.
Establishing democratic legitimacy for the EACJ when it adjudicates issues that are viewed as exclusively within each country's sovereign control is therefore a major concern. This issue is closely linked with questions of ensuring democratic control of competences delegated to international institutions, such as courts. This question is not uniquely African, 278 but it is particularly relevant in the African context because of the special attachment to sovereignty that African countries often exhibit. 279 Yet, notwithstanding this strong attachment to sovereignty in Africa, the story of the EACJ's human rights jurisprudence is about the ways in which the court has definitively established its autonomy from the EAC political organs and member states, in which the court has pushed back against attempts to establish hierarchical relations among EAC organs that would allow the Council to commandeer the roles of the EACJ and the EALA at will. In so doing, the court has been able to preserve for itself a significant amount of discretion in judicial decision-making that surpasses Law) (discussing the role that judges assume in the protection of their own institutional authority).
278. For a European perspective, see Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 643 (1999) ("[T]he key obstacle to supranational legitimacy is the difficulty in reproducing democratically-legitimate, hierarchical control outside the confines of the nation-state."). Supranational legitimacy has been justified by criteria such as "technocratic assertions of efficiency and expertise," transparency, and participation. Id. at 634 (proposing that the best way to think of the EU's legitimacy is by analogizing it to the modern administrative state rather than to the nation-state, which derives its legitimacy from the people).
279. See Stanlake JTM Samkrange, African Perspectives on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 11 AFR. SECURITY REV. 73 (2002) ("[T]he exploitation and degradation that resulted from African societies losing sovereignty and control to a foreign colonial entity, has prompted post-colonial states in Africa to be fiercely attached to international rights, protections and the recognition of that regained sovereignty.").
that of national judges of EAC member states. Instead of internalizing a restrictive understanding of their roles, as national judges in EAC member states often do, EACJ judges have pushed the boundaries. In doing so, they may have begun drawing the contours of judicial supremacy in the EAC. For now though, the Council prefers political negotiations as the driver of the integration process.
CONCLUSION
Rather than remain faithful to its lack of jurisdiction to decide human rights cases, the East African Court of Justice has deployed an elastic interpretive methodology that has allowed it to push the textual boundaries of its jurisdiction. This teleological or purposive methodology has emphasized the EAC Treaty's broad aims with respect to human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and good governance, while underemphasizing the textual limitations of the court's mandate. 280 In doing so, the court has failed to closely track the positions of EAC member states, particularly insofar as these states have specifically decided not to extend jurisdiction over cases involving human rights to the court. 281 By deciding that it has such jurisdiction, the court has engaged in expansive judicial policymaking. This is all the more remarkable because EAC states have seldom sought to debate their economic integration goals in the language and logic of law, much less of human rights law. 282 Only once, when political negotiations on the common market were at a near impasse, did the EAC States resort to the court, and there they sought an advisory opinion. 283 This paper has sought to account for the EACJ's activism. In particular, why did EAC states risk delegating jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Treaty to the court? Did they expect that the court would be faithful to the restrictions on its jurisdiction? Why did they fail to control appointments to the court, to prevent the possibility of a runaway court, in the same way that they have done domestically? Why did they fail to require the publication of the judges' votes in individual cases? And why have they not engaged in disbanding the court in the same way that member states of the SADC Tribunal did?
In answering these questions, this Article has borne in mind that in the early period of the ECJ, the six original EC members often objected to the court's power to interpret their respective national laws and to hold that certain conduct was inconsistent with EC law. 284 Rather than weighing the costs and benefits of compromising the sovereignty of member states as a result of the expansion of EC law, the ECJ asserted that law's full effectiveness. 285 The EACJ's expansive jurisprudence has been similarly resisted by member states. This paper tested the EACJ's expansive human rights jurisprudence against six contemporary theories that seek to explain delegation to international courts. None of these theories fits the East African experience.
The EACJ's activism is the culmination of three influences. First, it is a reflection of the determined efforts of the judges to make the court relevant and accessible to East Africans, who built the EACJ's role in the integration process through innumerable formal and informal contacts with lawyers, civil society groups, and governmental agencies of EAC member States, among other groups. 286 Second, by developing human rights case law, the judges have created a regional avenue in which East Africans can seek judicial confirmations of violations of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, despite the reluctance of national judiciaries to enforce human rights and the lack of confidence in the court among national representative institutions. The court is now regarded as a .pdf ("The EACJ is a legitimate avenue through which to seek redress, even if all the Court does is to make declarations of illegality of the impugned acts, whether of commission or omission. It would be well to remember that the court is a primary avenue through which the people can secure not only proper interpretation and application of the Treaty but also effective and expeditious compliance therewith."). valuable contribution to the EAC's integration process. 287 This case law has dovetailed very well with anti-impunity movements in East Africa and has laid a strong foundation for the court's legitimacy. Third, and as a result, the court has developed a strong reputation within multiple networks of civil society, professional, and other groups at the national and regional levels as a defender of human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. In effect, these groups have served as an insurance mechanism against extensive reductions in or suspensions of the court's jurisdiction. They have also provided a continuing stream of cases that have demonstrated that there is a demand for the court's human rights case law.
Ultimately, human rights litigation in the EACJ is part of a broader strategy of political mobilization that is giving voice to actors who did not have such legal recourse to advance their claims in the past. This mobilization is particularly important because discredited political institutions-parties, legislatures, and executives-are not regarded as avenues for addressing the concerns of ordinary citizens in their own national jurisdictions at the moment.
